Research

Life pension and Parliamentarian Effort (Job Market paper) 
Many democracies grant their parliamentarians access to an exclusive pension system. While there has been much debate about the financial cost of such schemes, little attention has been paid to their effect on parliamentary effort. We propose a model that captures the two main features of life pension schemes: i) the pension amount increases with seniority, and ii) age determines parliamentarians' eligibility. Our model highlights heterogeneous incentives to exert parliamentarian effort: introducing a life pension decreases the effort of eligible parliamentarians with high accumulation levels and increases or maintains the effort of all other parliamentarians. I test this model using the introduction of the life pension in Italy in 1955, where the eligibility of parliamentarians depends on their age, and the amount accumulated depends on their seniority. Our empirical results show that accumulating a higher pension stimulates parliamentarians to exert more effort, especially when parliamentarians are not eligible. In contrast, eligible parliamentarians face a trade-off between accumulating further benefits or enjoying the life pension immediately. Senior eligible parliamentarians decrease their effort while all others maintain or increase it.
Effectiveness of term limits combating administrative corruption (Submitted)
The performance of public servants and politicians is a fundamental determinant of the quality of institutions. While much attention has been paid to the incentives of public servants and politicians separately, little consideration has been given to the link between them. This paper demonstrates theoretically and empirically that corruption detection probability is a crucial factor in public servants’ decisions to act corruptly. It specifically examines the impact of term limit implementation and incumbent and challenger integrity on the rents extracted by public servants. Using the implementation of term limits in Portugal’s municipal elections in 2013, there was a remarkable reduction of administrative corruption in municipalities with term-limited mayors. This reduction increases with the difference between the integrity of the challenger and the incumbent. This paper demonstrates that term limits can effectively fight administrative corruption and provides empirical evidence of the links between the incentives of politicians and public servants.
Policy stringency and electoral accountability: Implementation of COVID-19 measures in Brazilian municipalities
Electoral motivations influence politicians' decision-making. This study examines the repercussions of electoral accountability on the policy's stringency. The analysis capitalizes on the context of Provisional Measure 926/2020 in Brazil, wherein municipal authorities are empowered to enact COVID-19 measures seven months before municipal elections. A comparative assessment is conducted between municipalities governed by mayors eligible for re-election and those constrained by term limits. The findings indicate that mayors eligible for re-election tend to adopt more COVID-19 measures. Specifically, such mayors are more inclined to enforce sanitary measures and mandatory face masks and are more likely to implement people screening measures. These outcomes underscore the significance of electoral incentives in shaping politicians' decision-making processes.
What are the main drivers of migration flows? (With Carmen Beviá and Bernardo Moreno)
This paper proposes a theoretical model that jointly analyzes the incentives that determine migration flows. The model considers the existence of two opposing forces embodied in incentives: i) the economic incentive and ii) the cultural incentive. In line with the literature analyzing the impact of diversity on the economy, the economic incentive attracts migrants of the type under-represented in society by increasing diversity. In contrast, the cultural incentive attracts immigrants of the type overrepresented in society. We find that there is an equilibrium of migration flows dependent on the society's diversity, wage level and production level. We also analyze the effect on the equilibrium of implementing migration policies that promote immigration of a specific type, such as highly educated migrants